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by Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell 
Full employment
is not just 
a dream
Europe’s leaders have pledged themselves to ambitious targets for
employment by 2010. Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell here
present them with a manifesto for how it can be achieved.
In Europe unemployment is too high and employment istoo low. Over 71/2% of Europe’s workforce is unemployedand only two thirds of people aged 15 to 64 are in work. 
At their Lisbon summit in 2000 the EU heads of government
set the target that by 2010 the employment rate should rise
from 64% to at least 70%. For older workers, aged
between 55 and 64, the employment rate should rise from
38% to at least 50%.
These are ambitious targets. They will require two big
changes: more people must seek work and, among those
seeking work, a higher proportion must get a job. So we
need higher participation and (for full employment) we need
a much lower unemployment rate.
Can it be done? A mere glance at the experience of differ-
ent European countries shows that it can. As Table 1
shows, four EU countries already exceed the overall target
for 2010 (Britain, Denmark, The Netherlands and Sweden).
And eight of the 15 countries in the EU already have lower
unemployment than the United States (the previous four,
plus Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal). 
So there is no such thing as “the European unemployment
problem”. The fundamental problem is high unemployment
in four of the five large countries: France, Germany, Italy
and Spain. If high overall unemployment in Europe is to be
reduced, these large countries will have to learn what they
can from the experience of the rest of Europe. At the same
time, no European country can be satisfied with its current
performance. In every country unemployment is higher than
in the 1960s and the participation rate (especially among
older workers) is unsustainably low. 
Many people doubt whether more jobs will result if more
people look for work. Indeed, some believe that the only
way to reduce unemployment is to reduce the number of
people looking for work – for example through early retire-
ment. This “lump of labour” fallacy is a profound error and,
unless people understand the process of job creation, there
is no chance of our hitting Europe’s employment target.
At any particular moment, the number of jobs is determined
by the amount people want to buy – that is by aggregate
demand. Aggregate demand is influenced by many factors,
mostly outside the direct control of policy makers. However,
monetary policy, in particular, is very important. In a reces-
sion, aggregate demand is low and this is reflected in
higher levels of unemployment. Monetary policy is then
generally loosened in order to stimulate aggregate demand.
As the economy recovers, at some stage it runs into labour
shortages and inflationary pressure. In anticipation of rising
inflation, monetary policy is then generally tightened. There
is an unemployment problem if, at this point, unemployment
is still high.
The key issue is how much unemployment remains when
labour shortages become excessive and inflation therefore
starts rising. This is known as the non-accelerating-inflation
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). It is, if you like, the sustain-
able rate of unemployment and, if there is no trend in infla-
tion up or down, it will also be the average rate of
unemployment over a run of years. 
This rate of unemployment differs greatly between countries
and over time. It depends on the institutions and policies
existing at the time. It is these factors that determine the
average unemployment rate. In other words, they determine
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Table 1. Unemployment rates and employment/
population ratios (%)
Unemployment Employment/
rate* Population**
aged 15-64 aged 55-64
Austria 4.0 68 27
Belgium 6.8 60 25
Denmark 4.2 76 57
Finland 9.1 68 46
France 9.2 62 37
Germany 8.1 66 37
Greece 7.3 56 38
Ireland 4.4 65 47
Italy 9.0 55 19
Luxembourg 2.4 63 25
Netherlands 2.6 74 39
Portugal 4.4 69 50
Spain 11.3 59 39
Sweden 5.3 75 67
UK 5.2 71 52
EU 7.5 64 39
EU Target (2010) 70 50
USA 6.0 73 58
Japan 5.2 69 62
*  April 2002 
** 2001
Source: HM Treasury Pocket Databank, 31 July 2002; OECD Employment
Outlook, July 2002 (pages 304-9).
how many jobs there will be for a given total labour force.
At all times the number of jobs will depend on aggregate
demand. But, because of the inflation constraint, aggregate
demand will be restricted by the amount of available labour.
So, over a run of years, the number of jobs will ultimately
depend on the available supply of those who are ready and
willing to take up jobs. This proposition is crucial and many
of the mistakes in employment policy come from a failure to
understand it. 
If you think of the changes in employment and labour supply
over the centuries, it is quite obvious how wrong it is. There
is further strong evidence from the recent past. As Figure 1
shows, the supply of labour has grown at hugely different
rates in different countries. But the number of jobs in each
country has grown more or less in line with the growth in
labour supply. 
Countries also differ in their levels of labour force participa-
tion. If the “lump of labour” theory were true, one might
expect those with lower labour force participation rates to
have lower unemployment. But, as Figure 2 shows, this is
not so. If anything, it is the other way round. One might also
expect that the countries that had lowered their participation
rate most would have also lowered their unemployment
most. Again, as Figure 3 shows, this is not so. 
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Figure 1. % growth in the labour force and employment
1960-2000
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Figure 2. Labour force participation rate (aged 15-64)
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Figure 3. % points change in labour force participation
rate (aged 15-64) and in unemployment rate
(1990s compared with 1980s)
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Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1958-1978 (pages 18, 24) and
1979-1999 (pages 11- 13); European Economy, 73, 2001 (pages 274-5)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 2002 (pages 208-9)
There is no such thing as ‘the European employment problem’
Figure 4. Long-term unemployment and the 
duration of benefits
Source: Benefit duration is from Nickell and Layard in Ashenfelter and Card
(eds), Handbook of Labor Economics Vol. 3 and relates to 1992. LTU data
are from OECD Employment Trends and relate to 1989-98.
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So the starting point is that, if we increase the supply of
labour, we shall increase employment. This has two impli-
cations. First, we can increase employment by increasing
labour force participation (for example, that of single
mothers or older people). Second, we can increase
employment by increasing the effective supply of 
labour from people who are already searching for 
work unsuccessfully. 
The key evidence concerns the relation between
unemployment and vacancies. When vacancies are high,
unemployment should be relatively low – because it is easy
for unemployed people to find work. Yet, strikingly, in
France, West Germany, Belgium and Spain vacancies in
recent years have been extremely high by historical
standards, despite high unemployment. (No vacancy data
are available for Italy.) It is this high level of vacancies that
helped to generate increasing European inflation in
2000/1, which led to higher interest rates and the end of
the European recovery. 
In all these four countries vacancies in 2000/1 were far
higher than in 1975. One would, therefore, expect that
unemployment would have been lower than in 1975. But in
fact it was more than double (except in Belgium). The main
upward shift of unemployment relative to vacancies
occurred in the 1980s. During that period a similar shift
occurred in almost every European country. But in Britain,
Denmark, and The Netherlands something different then
occurred in the 1990s. Unemployment fell back close to its
level in 1975. This reflected a structural shift, since vacan-
cies did not rise compared with 1990 – if anything the
reverse. So in these three countries the unemployed
became much more effective at filling vacancies, while in
France, Germany, Belgium and Spain they did not. Why
was this? 
There is no evidence of any major change in the mismatch
between the characteristics of the unemployed and the
characteristics of the jobs available in any of the countries
we are discussing. So the change must have been a
change in the matching process – in how unemployed
people are treated. 
Even in the 1980s it was evident that unemployment differ-
ences between countries were influenced by how
unemployed people were treated. It was striking that the
United States had virtually no long-term unemployment
(defined as a duration of over a year), while Europe had
almost as many long-term unemployed as short-term
employed. The most obvious explanation was the long-
duration unemployment benefits that existed in Europe but
not the US. This relationship is depicted crudely in Figure 4.
The duration and level of benefits are one set of factors
influencing unemployment. But even more important is the
help that unemployed people get in finding work and the
conditions that apply to the receipt of benefit. These two
factors, active labour market policy and benefit conditional-
ity, work best in conjunction with each other.
Clearly, one way to reduce long-term dependence on
benefits is to make sure that they are used for their intended
purpose – to support people who are not working and who
really cannot find work. In other words, the right to benefits
must be matched by an obligation to get a job, if jobs exist.
There must be a “test of willingness to work”.
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The ‘lump of labour fallacy’ is a profound error
As a recent OECD conference revealed*, countries differ
amazingly in the framework within which benefits are
dispensed. Experience shows that unemployed people are
more available to fill employers’ vacancies, if
(i) benefits are paid through the same office as that where
people are placed in work;
(ii) unemployed people have to attend regularly in person;
and
(iii)unemployed people are expected after a period to be
available for most types of work, even if this involves
substantial journey times or even (as in a few countries)
moving home with the help of a subsidy.
The problem with imposing strict availability conditions is
that these are difficult to apply unless the employment
service is extremely active in helping people to get offers of
work. So a “stricter benefit regime” to reduce “passive”
dependence on benefits only makes sense if linked to an
“active” labour market policy to help people back into work.
The two should be complementary. 
This is the policy known as “welfare-to-work”. The phrase
comes from America, where it mainly applies to lone
mothers. But the practice as applied to unemployed people
has been mainly developed in Europe. Denmark, The
Netherlands and Britain all introduced major welfare-to-
work policies in the 1990s. And in the last year or two
France, Germany and Spain have taken more limited steps
towards greater conditionality.
In labour market policy there has to be an especial focus on
preventing long-term unemployment, since it is so destruc-
tive. This means ensuring that everyone gets offers of work
or training within a year or so of becoming unemployed, as
required by the EU Luxembourg Guidelines. Britain,
Denmark and The Netherlands do this for young people, but
only Denmark and The Netherlands do it for people of all
ages. The aim must if possible be to channel offers of work
from regular employers, mainly in the private sector. But, to
prevent long-term dependence on benefits, we need to
ensure some worthwhile activity for everyone. It must be
actively aimed at employability, so that, when we cannot
secure a regular job, we should offer meaningful work with
NGOs or socially useful projects. The measure of success
is the numbers who get regular work and keep it.
Welfare-to-work must involve the principle of
mutual obligation. The state has an obligation to
ensure that offers of work are channelled to every
unemployed person within a reasonable time after
becoming unemployed. But in return the citizen
should take advantage of those offers, or lose some or
all of their benefit if they do not do so, unless there are
medical reasons to the contrary. The Luxembourg
Guidelines should be extended to include this.
As always, there is the issue of whether such policies can
really expand employment. Many doubt whether active
labour market measures can work owing to “displacement”
and “substitution”. In extreme form, these fears derive from
the “lump-of-labour” fallacy: if the number of jobs is fixed
and we enable Mr X to get one of them, then some other
person must by definition go without work.
Evidence on substitution and replacement is by its nature
difficult to obtain. In the past it has been mainly got by
asking questions to employers. When a subsidy is evalu-
ated, employers are often asked: 1. How many of those
hired would you have hired anyway? (“Deadweight”); 2.
How many of the jobs would have been filled by other
recruits in any case? (“Substitution”); 3. How many of the
new subsidised jobs represent an increase in your own
employment at the expense of your competitors?
(“Displacement”). The measure of net job creation resulting
from the subsidy is then said to be the total number of
subsidised jobs minus 1, 2 and 3. 
Until recently this procedure has been used almost univer-
sally and often implies that net job creation is only 20% of
the total number of jobs subsidised. Yet these estimates of
substitution and deadweight are based on a theory of the
labour market that is never used for any other purpose.
The theory being used is that, if somebody would have been
employed in one place and that opportunity closes down,
then unemployment increases permanently – by that
amount. This makes no allowance for the possibility that
people who find one channel of employment blocked will
find another channel. The procedure is especially extraordi-
nary when one considers that typically half the people
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The key concerns the relation between unemployment and vacancies
*See Labour Market Policies and the Public Employment Service, OECD 2001.] 
supposedly sent into unemployment by the process of
substitution are people who already have a job and would
have simply been changing jobs.
Only recently have economists began to realise that the old
assumptions about substitution are invalid. Lawrence Katz
of Harvard University, for example, has insisted on a more
rational analysis of the main US wage subsidy programme
for youth, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. Until 1988 it
covered disadvantaged young people aged between 18
and 24, but from then onwards it ceased to apply to people
aged 23 and 24. This change provided a good controlled
experiment, enabling one to isolate the effects of the
subsidy previously on the employment of 23 and 24 year
olds. His conclusion was 40-52% of the subsidised jobs
had represented net additions to employment.
Interestingly, evaluations of more intensive job search assis-
tance have never suffered from the problems discussed
above. They have generally shown good value for money.
These can have the added advantage that extra effort is
easily focussed on those who really need it. This is an
important element in any active labour market policy and
helps to reduce “deadweight”.
One further point on unemployed people. Throughout
Europe, ethnic minorities are a growing proportion of the
labour force and their unemployment rates are usually much
higher than the average. Ethnic minorities need especial
help and the same principle applies to them as to all
citizens: the principle of rights and responsibilities. They,
more than most, need the right to offers of work or training
but they also have the responsibility to master the language
of their adopted country and to use the offers that are avail-
able to them.
Moving on to older workers and mothers, there are two
issues that these two groups share in common. First, there
is the issue of distortions. Those not working may for that
reason be receiving state benefits, in which case there is a
cost to the rest of society and, therefore, a possibility that
incentives are inefficiently distorted away from work.
Second, there is the issue, arising from higher longevity and
lower birth rates, that we need to increase the numbers in
work in order to pay for the growing numbers of dependent
elderly. That said, the reasons for non-participation are very
different for older people and for single mothers – and so
are the policies needed to increase participation.
Among older people (aged 55 to 64) only 42% are in the
labour force and only 38% are working – making an
unemployment rate of 8%, the same as the overall rate.
This highly unsatisfactory situation is very similar to what it
was ten years ago. To find out what is causing it, we can
learn a lot from the huge differences in participation rates
and employment rates across countries (see Table 1) and
their time series variation. There are a number of key
explanatory factors. 
The first is the standard age of retirement at which state
benefits become payable. The second is the use of
unemployment benefits as a form of early retirement benefit,
with none of the usual job search conditions attached. And
the third is the availability of invalidity benefits, often not
properly monitored to see whether the person still suffers
from the problem they had when they first went on to
benefit. (Some 15% of all men aged between 55 and 64
are on invalidity benefit in Britain, Germany and Italy and
25% in The Netherlands.) To achieve higher participation of
older workers will require changes in all of these practices,
but especially in the standard age of requirement.
But there must also be wider changes in society’s attitudes
and approaches to older people. By 2006 at the latest every
European country must have introduced laws against age
discrimination in employment. But this will only succeed if at
the same time older workers become genuinely more
attractive to employers through progressive updating of
skills, either by workplace learning or independent study.
Continuous learning and adequate job mobility in middle
age are important to prevent workers become burned out or
bored before their natural working life is over. 
Among people of working age, mothers are the other main
group who are often not working. The number of non-
working mothers is falling rapidly, but must continue to fall if
employment targets are to be met. For policy purposes it is
important to distinguish between those whose choice is
relatively undistorted (married mothers) and those who may
be eligible for state benefits. The single mothers face us
with the more serious problem.
The first issue is the availability and conditionality of income
support from the state. In some countries, like Britain,
support is available without any job search requirement. In
others, job search is required except when the children are
very young. Generally, participation is higher where job
search is required. A second issue is the availability of work
with suitable hours. Where part-time work is readily avail-
able, some mothers who would not otherwise work will
choose to do so. Then there is the question of leave. If a
pregnant mother retains her right to return to her job,
employment rates will be higher. And, finally, there is the
issue of childcare – the more childcare is available, the
more women will work. If Europe wishes to achieve its
employment targets, all these issues will have to be
addressed.
We have focussed so far on the supply side of the market,
but the demand side is also important. If wages are held too
high, employers will not employ the available supply. There
are two issues here. One is the general level of real wages.
At a given level of unemployment, these will be pushed too
high, either if the unemployed are not effectively supplying
their labour, or if there is autonomous wage push, due for
example to union militancy or rises in import prices. Wage
push is only likely in the context of unions and has been
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Countries differ amazingly in their benefits framework
avoided in many of the smaller European countries by
coordinated efforts of employers and unions 
(The Netherlands), or sometimes by the unions on their own
(as at times in Sweden), or by employer solidarity (Portugal).
The second and most serious problem concerns relative
wages, across skills or regions. Unemployment rates are
much higher for unskilled people. One reason for this is a
greater rigidity of wages at the bottom end. However, most
legal minimum wages in Europe are low enough to cause no
problem. Indeed, in some monopsonistic markets they may
even raise employment. The more serious consequences of
wage rigidity occur at the regional level, where overly high
wages are a major cause of unemployment in the former
East Germany, southern Italy and southern Spain.
Experience in the US (and to a degree the UK) suggests that
marked differences in unemployment rates across regions
can be reduced whenever two re-equilibrating factors are at
work. The first is wage adjustment. If unemployment is
higher in one region than another, wages in the high
unemployment region decline vis-à-vis wages in the low-
unemployment region. This attracts investment, which leads
to more jobs in areas of high unemployment. The second re-
equilibrating factor is regional labour mobility: net migration
away from the high-unemployment regions.
In Continental Europe, these two re-equilibrating factors
are often not allowed to operate properly. Centralised
wage-setting institutions deter the emergence of significant
regional wage differentials. At the same time, a number of
factors – including state transfers to the high-unemploy-
ment areas – reduce the pressure to migrate. Thus, large
regional labour market imbalances – the North-South
divide in Italy and Spain or the West-East divide in
Germany – are a prominent feature of the European
landscape. Persistently high unemployment in some
regions is also associated with low participation rates and
a deterioration of the environment in which firms have to
operate. In high-unemployment regions the public sector
tends to pay more than the private sector (at least in terms
of entry wages) and provides more job security. If it is diffi-
cult to get a public sector job when already employed in
the private sector, this encourages “wait unemployment”,
where people (sometimes the most educated people)
queue for public sector jobs to become vacant. 
In order to move these regions away from the high
unemployment/low participation equilibria in which they are
trapped, it is necessary to act on both the demand and the
supply side. On the demand side, it is necessary to pursue
greater decentralisation in collective bargaining; wages
should be allowed to vary across regions so as to reflect
more closely the differences in labour productivity and the
cost of living. Decentralisation in pay determination should
extend to the public administration and be accompanied by
the introduction of incentives for higher productivity and
hiring procedures that discourage queuing. 
On the supply side, the task is to bring welfare-to-work
principles into the cash transfers provided to non-employed
individuals in these regions. A key requirement here is to
have unemployment benefits, rather than other instruments
(like early retirement and invalidity pensions) that merely
encourage non-participation in the labour market rather than
supporting job search. Welfare-to-work should encourage
regional labour mobility, but should circulate information on
jobs available in more buoyant labour markets and
sometimes also subsidise moving costs. Regional mobility
should not necessarily involve long-range migration, as
there are often areas within the high unemployment regions
that are more dynamic.
Finally, there is the thorny issue of employment protection.
In public rhetoric it is common to attribute high European
unemployment to high employment protection. But in fact
employment protection is especially high in some
European countries (like Portugal, Sweden, Norway and
The Netherlands) where unemployment is well below the
US level. The bulk of the economic evidence suggests that
employment protection raises long-term unemployment (by
reducing hiring), reduces short-term employment (by
reducing firing) and has no clear effect on total employ-
ment. But specific policies to prevent the closure of enter-
prises are inefficient.
The main danger of employment protection is that it
strengthens the hand of workers in wage bargaining,
leading to excessive wage pressure even when unemploy-
ment is high. Any effort to reduce employment protection
should have this issue firmly in view. Unfortunately, the
famous Spanish labour market reform of 1984 did not. It
introduced temporary employment contracts, while actually
increasing the security of the insiders who were already
employed. As a result, there was no reduction in wage
pressure. All efforts aimed at creating a dual labour market
are likely to fail in exactly the same way as the original
Spanish reform.
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40-52% of subsidised jobs represent net additions
Our conclusion is that what really matter are:
for unemployment
n how unemployed people are treated
n regional wage flexibility
for the employment of older workers
n reduced subsidies to inactivity, used if necessary to
finance employment subsidies
n lifelong learning
n an older official retirement age, where appropriate
n anti-discrimination legislation
for single mothers
n reduced subsidies to inactivity
n more child-care help
n more opportunities to work part-time
Full employment is not an unattainable dream. We can elimi-
nate long-term unemployment and ensure that all who want
work can find it within a reasonable time. The principles to
achieve this aim cannot usefully be summarised as simply a
need for “more labour market flexibility”. In many cases
what is needed is more activism and even, sometimes,
more regulation. 
We must stop pretending that “more flexibility” is the
answer to all our employment problems. What is required is
a clear focus on the three main issues that will make a
difference: the treatment of the unemployed, the flexibility of
wages and the treatment of older workers.
Richard Layard is Co-Director of the CEP.
Stephen Nickell is a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee and a member of the CEP.
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There must be changes in society’s attitudes to older people
